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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-vZOLLA HALES,
Defendant-Appellant.

..
..
.

Case No . 18083

..
..

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Zolla Hales, appeals from a
conviction of wilfully destroying public records in the Fourth
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Zolla Hales, wa? charged with

wilfully destroying public records over which she had custody
in violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-8-412 (1953), as amended,
a third-degree felony.

On the 20th day of August, 1981, the

appellant was found guilty of the charge by a jury.

After

referral to the Adult Probation and Parole Department for a
pre-sentence investigation report, the appellant was sentenced
to eighteen months' probation and $1,000.00 in fines.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the conviction and
judgment pronounced below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appell2nt, Zolla Hales, was charged with
wilfully destroying tbe Elk Ridge town financial records in a
fire occurring on or about February 11, 1980.
The

appella~t

servea as the Elk Ridge Town Recorder

from December 1976 until January 1980.

She was authorized to

have personal custody of the financial records in her home
since the town had no depository facility in which to house
the records.

Her duties incluaea the receipt, recording and

disbursement of Elk

~idge

town funds (T. 20).

From 1977 until

April, 1970 the appellant's husband served on the... Elk Ridge
City Council.

In this capacity he was authorized to counter-

sign checks drawn on pJblic funds issued by the appellant (T.
20).

Following tje announcement of her resignation in
Nove~ber,

1979, the ap?ellant was to prepare the financial

records for audit ana
21, 22).

~ransfer

to the succeeding recorder (T.

s~ould

have occurred when the successor

The transfer

took office in January, 1980.
February 11, 1980, the
records to the auditor.

At the time of the fire on

appel~ant

still had not transferred the

The appellant's successor never

received any financial records from the appellant (T. 32).

-2-
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At trial the appellant contended that on February
11, 1980, she completed the record for audit in front of the
fireplace in their home (T. 99).

Allegedly leaving the

records on a metal chair near the fire, she said she left the
home intending to run some errands and to deposit the
completed record with the auditor in Spanish Fork (T. 35).
About thirty minutes after she left the house she claimed she
realized she had forgotten the records and returned to find
them "engulfed" in flames leaping two or three feet high (T.
29, 51).

She then purportedly picked up the hot metal chair,

protecting her hands with towels, and transported the
conflagration through the house to the outside patio (T. 35).
She then doused the flames with water and extinguished the
blaze.

The appellant's husband arrived from Orem after she

telephoned him with the news of the incident.

In an effort to

have an authority "visualize" the incident, the appellant
called the succeeding recorder and asked her to come and
witness the aftermath and offer advice (T. 95).
The state showed that the succeeding town recorder
was persistently encouraged by the appellant's husband to sift
through the debris and remove what was salvageable after the
successor arrived at the scene {T. 109).

Refusing to follow

the Council member's directions because she felt someone in
authority should examine the remains, the new Town Recorder
suggested that the mayor be called.

The appellant's
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husband replied that he "didn't give a damn what anyone else
thought and they could all go to hell as far as he was
concerned"

(T. 110).

After repeated remonstration by the Town

Recorder, the appellant's husband telephoned the town mayor

(T. 110).

The mayor notified the sheriff and county fire

marsh all.
The expert inspections that occurred 4 or 5 hours
after the alleged fire indicated that there was no smoke odor
or stain in the room or on its furnishings as would be
expected after such a fire (T. 50, 66).

There was no trail of

debris or burns in the flooring along the path the appellant
allegedly took from the fireplace to the patio outside (T.
42).

No evidence of burning or singeing was observed on the

person of the appellant although she claimed to have carried
the metal chair with the fire on it through the house (T. 52,
63).

Finally, there was substantial debris and evidence of

burning outside on the patio where the fire was put out (T.
48, 69).
Steve Kennedy, the Utah State Fire Marshall with
more than 25 years' arson investigation experience, examined
the premises and remains on February 15, 1980 (T. 75).

He

testified that throughout his experience, no fire had been
attributed to a spark going through a screen as appellant
maintained (T. 81).

Additionally, the Fire Marshall indicated

that fires produced by sparks took hours to develop into
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flame and cause a great deal of smoke before flames erupt (T.
83).

He also said the metal chair was not sufficiently

damaged to have supported the heat from the fire that
destroyed the records (T. 82); further, that the limited
damage to the exterior of the ledger books, that portion that
is hard to ignite, indicated that the extensive damage to the
contents or pages of the records was unreasonable without the
aid of an accelerant or flammable (T. 80, 81).
J

The jury found the appellant guilty of violating

Utah Code Ann., § 76-8-412 (1953), as amended--wilfully
destroying public records held in custody.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS REGARDING THE
STRENGTH OF THE DEFENSE EVIDENCE DID NOT
VIOLATE THE DEFENDANT'S FIFTH AMENDMENT
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.
Following the presentation of evidence at the
defendant's trial, the prosecutor commented on the basis and
motive of the testimony of the defendant's husband:

-5-
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Now with regard to Mr. Hales' testimony.
He has not been accused in this case,
he's not on trial, but he wasn't even a
witness to the burning or the aftermath
of the burning, the immediate aftermath.
But yet he's the one who tells the story.
His comment, and I quote, "I don't give a
damn," to Terri Tuttle is more than just
mere words.
And I think we need to
analyze his motive in testifying.
(T. 128).

After the defense made its closing argument, the

prosecutor rebutted as follows:

Now the testimony, really, if testimony
it is regarding how it occurred, how the
burning occurred, comes from the
Statement of the defendant that you will
have as an exhibit.
She would be the
only one to come in and say how it
happened, because apparently her husband
was not at home at the time, and yet he's
the one who testifies as to what
occurred. Now it seems to me the
defendant's argument to you is asking you
to absolutely disregard your senses with
regard to who has proved what.
I'm
surprised that he made no comment on the
issue of motive.
That's strange.

(T. 142, 143).

The defendant maintains that these comments

constitute an abridgement of her right to refuse to testify
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court, in Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), held that:

-6-
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• • . the Fifth Amendment, . . • in its
bearing on the states by reason of the
Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either
comment by the prosecution on the
accused's silence or instructions by the
court that such silence is evidence of
guilt.
Griffin at 615.
The Supreme Court further developed the Griff in
doctrine in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967):
At the time of the trial, Art. I, § 13,
of the State's constitution provided that
"in any criminal case, whether the
defendant testifies or not, his failure
to explain or to deny by his testimony
any evidence or facts in the case against
him may be commented upon by the court
and by counsel, and may be considered by
the court or the jury." Both petitioners
in this case chose not to testify at
their trial, and the State's attorney
prosecuting them took full advantage of
his right under the State Constitution to
comment upon their failure to testify,
filling his argument to the jury from
beginning to end with numerous references
to their silence and inference of guilt
resulting therefrom.
The trial court
also charged the jury that it could draw
adverse inferences from petitioners'
failure to testify.
Chapman at 19.

There is no question that the comments in

Chapman violated that accused's Fifth Amendment rights as
established in Griffin.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held:

-7-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

We conclude that there may be some
constitutional errors which in the
setting of a particular case are so
unimportant and insignificant that they
may, consistent with the Federal
Constitution, be deemed harmless, not
requiring the automatic reversal of the
conviction.
Chapman at 22.

The Supreme Court recognized the inherent

danger of abuse of a harmless error rule;

it therefore

provided a high standard that must be met in order to invoke
the rule.

a "court must be able to declare a belief [that the

error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."

Chapman at

24.

Following Griff in and Chapman, the Utah Supreme
Court has drawn clear interpretive standards addressing the
distinction between prosecutorial comments constituting error
and comments deemed harmless.

In State v. Kazda, Utah, 540

P.2d 949 (1975), this Court stated:
It is not to be doubted that the
right of a defendant not to testify in a
criminal trial is a fundamental right
protected by both the federal and the
Ut~~ Constitutions.
Its exercise should
in no way prejudice him in the eyes of
.the court or jury.
He need give no
reason; and there should be no concern as
to his reason for not testifying.
The
simple and immutable fact is, that for
what we accept as good and sufficient
reasons, the privilege has been long
established that comments concerning an
accused's failure to testify, however
adroitly disguised, may have the effect

-8-
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of impairing or destroying the privilege;
and that this should not be done.
The other side of this proposition
is:
that the prosecutor, and the public,
whose interest he represents, should and
does have a right to argue the case upon
the basis of the total picture shown by
the evidence or lack thereof.
If either
counsel cannot voice a challenge to the
effect of the total evidence, then one is
made to wonder, what may he talk about?
It is our opinion that it is not only the
prerogative, but the duty of either
counsel, to analyze all aspects of the
evidence; and this should include any
pertinent statements or deductions
reasonably to be drawn therefrom as to
what the evidence is or is not, and what
it does or does not show. The
prosecutor's comment under scrutiny here
falls within the principle just stated;
and he made no direct reference to the
fact that the defendant had not taken the
stand.
This problem has arisen in sister
states who have ruled that statements of
the nature here involved are legitimate
comments on what the total evidence does
or does not show, and·are not violative
of the constitutional right defendant
asserts.
Kazda at 951 (emphasis added).

According to Kazda, the

statements "The defense has presented no evidence as to why
the defendant was out there.

What was he doing out there?"

were held not to be a direct reference to the defendant's
failure to testify.

Rather, they were an exercise of the

obligation to present all the evidence, even though the
comments' ambiguity might have impacted on the jury.
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In reaffirming the duty and privilege of counsel to
argue the whole evidence, this Court in State v. Eaton, Utah,
569 P.2d 1114 (1977) added a new dimension to the Chapman
decision as it applies in Utah.

Not only must the Court be

able to say that ·the comments were harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, but it must be "clear beyond a reasonable
doubt in that the result would have been the same" (Eaton at
1116) in order to have harmless, non-prejudicial error.
A final

standard was developed in State v.

Norneland, Utah, 581 P.2d 1010 (1978).

This Court held that a

jury instruction informing the jury that the defendant's
failure to testify was not to be considered in the
deliberations was advantageous, not prejudicial to the
defendant.

Quoting a Rhode Island case, this Court elaborated

on the propriety of the prosecution's comments:
In order that there be a violation of
Griffin, it must appear that the language
used by the prosecution • . • was
manifestly intended or was of such
character that a jury would naturally and
necessarily consider it to amount to a
comment on the failure of the accused to
testify.
State v. Jefferson, 353 A.2d 190, 198 (R.I. 1976}.
A careful reading of the closing arguments in this
case will show that the prosecutor's comments did not violate
the defendant's Fifth Amendment right and ao not warrant
reversal under the standards provided above (T. 127-129,
131-132, 142-143).
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The prosecutor's first comment was designed to
discredit and weaken t~e testimony of the defendant's husband
by emphasizing inconsistent evidence, providing the inference
of a possible motive for the testimony, ana by noting a lack
of basis for the

testi~ony

offered.

Under Kazda, this

argument is considered a public obligation or duty--a right or
privilege which accompanies counsel in his responsibilities at
trial.

The same is true of the second contested comment.

defense's challenge "They haven't proved anything"

The

(T. 132)

which recurred repeatedly throughout the argument, was
answered in the prosecution's final statement.

The comments

pointed out that the defense had only shown what was contained
in the defendant's "Statement" and what was contained in the
husband's testimony.

The delicate balance of permissible and

impermissible comment under Kazda was not breached by either
of these comments.
The implication of the first comment must be
greatly extended to provide an inference that the defendant
failed to testify.

The second comment more easily is

construed to amount to a comment on the defendant's failure to
testify.

This is only because of the proximity in the

argument to the reference of what the defendant did provide.
Acknowledgment by the reaf firnation of the husband's absence
from the scene about which he testified cannot be considered a
direct reference to the cefenaant's failure to testify at
trial under Kazda.
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Contrary to the defenaant's assertion, the verdict
in this case aid not hinge on the prosecution's comments;
there was substantial· evidence presented sufficient to sustain
the conviction without the prosecutor's comments.

The lack of

evidence of fire in the home shortly after the burning was to
have taken place, the great evidence of burning outside the
home, the inadequate damage to the metal chair, lack of burns
or singes on defendant's person, the high improbability of a
spark igniting the records as the defense postulates, the
theory of embezzlement providing a motive for the destruction,
and the unreliability of the defendant's husband's testimony
could have sustained the verdict without any argument by the
prosecutor whatsoever.

Eaton, supra.

The defendant maintains

that the testimony of the Utah State Fire Marshall, Mr. Steven
Kennedy, is particularly representative of the weak evidence
offered by the State; yet appellant noticeably fails in his
brief to identify wherein the testimony is weak.

Mr. Kennedy

aaequately qualified himself as an expert in arson investigation with experience in the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the National Board of Fire Underwriters, and the State of
Utah, totaling more than 40 years of arson investigation.
testimony and opinion was corroborated and unrefuted.
is no weakness in the State's evidence as the defendant
contends.
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His

There

What effect, if any, the comments had on the jury
is relevant.

It is highly speculative that the jury

associated the statements as a possible reference to the
defendant's failure to testify since even the defense counsel
apparently failed to notice it when the comment was made.
Defendant's failure to object is a clear indication that the
comments in their context, tone, and tenor did not naturally
and necessarily alarm the jury as to the defendant's failure
to testify.

Nomeland, supra.
Moreover, any possible prejudice which might have

been created by the comments was further minimized by the
Court's instruction number 10:
The defendant is not required to testify
on her own behalf. The law expressly
gives her the privilege of not testifying
if she so desires.
The fact that she has
not taken the witness stand must not be
taken as any indication of her guilt, nor
should you indulge in·any presumption or
inference adverse to her by reason
thereof.
The burden remains with the
state, regardless of whether the
defendant testifies in her own behalf or
not, to prove by the evidence her guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
According to Nomeland, supra, this instruction enhances the
defennant's position although she did not testify.
Finally, the prosecutor's comments were presented
with no intention to make an issue of, or reference to, the
fact that the defendant did not testify.

In the first
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

instance the comment was intended to discredit the defense
witness.

In the second statement, the intention was clearly

to rebut the defendant's argument as to who had proved what.
It is clear from the transcript that the prosecutor had no
intention of developing an assumption of guilt by an inference
that the defendant did not testify.

The prosecutor's intent

or lack of motive in making the comments is a relevant factor
which may be considered by this Court in determining whether
error occurred.

Nomeland, supra; Jefferson, supra.

In summary, since the prosecutor's comments were
not direct references to the defendant's failure to testify,
were not intended to naturally or necessarily prejudice the
jury, and would not have changed the result of the case if
left unsaid, there was no reversible error in their utterance.
The prosecution fulfilled his obligation and duty to argue the
whole evidence before the jury in making the comments.
POINT II
UTAH CODE ANN., §§ 76-6-504 AND 76-8-412
(1953), AS AMENDED, IX) NOT PROSCRIBE THE
.SAME CONDUCT; APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY
CONVICTED UNDER THE APPROPRIATE STATUTE
AND THEREFORE THE CONVICTION SHOULD
STAND.
Appellant contends that Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-6-504

(1953), as amended, proscribes the same conduct as Utah Code

Ann.,

§

76-8-412 (1953), as amended.

Section 76-6-504

-14-
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provides:
(1) Any person who, having no privilege
to do so, knowingly falsifies, destroys,
removes, or conceals any writing, other
than the writings enumerated in section
76-6-503, or record, public or private,
with intent to deceive or injure any
person or to conceal any wrongdoing is
guilty of tampering with records.
(2) Tampering with records is a class B
misdemeanor.
section 76-8-412 states:
Every officer having the custody of any
record, map, or book, or of any paper or
proceedings of any court, filed or
deposited in any public office, or placed
in his hanas for any purpose, who is
guilty of stealing, willfully destroying,
mutilating, defacing, altering,
falsifying, removing, or secreting the
whole or any part thereof, or who permits
any other person so to do, is guilty of a
felony of the third degree.
If these statutes do proscribe the same conduct, or if there
is doubt or uncertainty as to whether they proscribe the same
or similar conduct, then the appellant is entitled to the
benefit of the application of the statute proscribing the
lesser penalty.
146 (1969) •.

State v. Shondell, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d

However, contrary to appellant's contention, the

statutes on their face and in their manifest purpose address
different offenses and correspondingly different conduct.
A first general distinguishing feature

is found in

the titles of the statutes which describe the conduct they
-15-
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prohibit.

Section 76-6-504 is styled "Tampering with

Records," while Section 76-8-412 is entitled "Stealing,
destroying, or mutilating public records by custodian."
Additionally, Section 76-6-504 is placed in the chapter of the
Sect ion

Code describing fraudulent offenses against property.

76-8-412 appears in the chapter concerning offenses against
the government.

These first-glance distinguishing factors

shed light on the divergent purpose of the statutes.

Section

76-6-504 protects the people of the State of Utah from the
fraudulent tampering with records and writings generally, to
provi<le a remedy for third persons harmed by the destruction.
In contrast, Section 76-8-412 is designed to protect the
integrity of the government.

These general distinctions are

developed and accentuated with a more specific examination of
the statutes.
Section 76-6-504 can be violated by any person,
regardless of his capacity.

Section 76-8-412 cannot be

violated by anyone except a public official.

In addition, the

official must have a custodial obligation with respect to the
records destroyed or mutilated.

The importance of the

person/officer and custodian/non-custodian distinctions are
highlighted by the general purposes of the statutes mentioned
above.

Under Section 76-8-412, the inegrity of the government

is the concern.

This integrity cannot be violated except by a

person who has become an agent for the government through an
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official capacity.

Further, the official must have custody of

the record in order to focus the responsibility for the trust
extended to the officer.

No such concern for agency and

responsibility is contemplated by Section 76-6-504.

There the

harm is to the public or third persons generally and therefore
anyone may violate the statute.
The mental element required under each statute is
different.

Section 76-6-504 requires a "knowing" state of

mind for the act while Section 76-8-412 demands a "willful"
intent.

This subtle but important distinction is indicated by

the definitions of "knowing" and "willful."

A person acts:

(1) Intentionally, or with intent or
willfully with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to a result of his
conduct, when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with
respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct
when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or the existing circumstances. A
person acts knowingly, or with knowledge,
with respect to a result of his conduct
when he is aware that his conduct is
reasonably certain to cause the result.
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-2-103.

This significant distinction

relates to the burden of proof required to convict under each
statute.

To show a "conscious objective or desire to engage

in the conduct or cause the result" as required by Section
76-8-412 is harder to prove than is an awareness "that his
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conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result"
by Section 76-6-504.

a~

demanded

To protect a custodian who may have

knowingly destroyed ~ublic records without having the desire
to cause the result of the mutilated documents, the statute
requires a showing of wilfulness.

Such a high burden of proof

is not needed in Section 76-6-504 since that statute requires
a showing of fraud to convict.
The statutes pertain explicitly to differing
subject matter.

Section 76-6-504 proscribes the mutilation or

destruction of "any writing or record, public or private."
Section 76-8-412 deals with public records filed or deposited
with a public official.
significant.

A

The location of the record is

driver's or business license is a public

record or writing which is not deposited with an official.
Since the government is not responsible for the housing of the
document, the alteration of the license or destruction thereof
does not reflect on the integrity of the government.

In

contrast, the government has an abiding interest in records
kept in official custody, making this distinction substantial.
Finally, a violation of Section 76-6-504 requires
proof of the traditional elements of fraud,

including an

intentional misrepresentation, reliance, and some sort of
detriment.

Section 76-8-412 does not require such a showing.

The interest of maintenance of government integrity in Section
76-8-412 obviates the requirement of a showing of
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some damage or harm.

~he

destruction of a record by an

official in custody of the record is sufficient in and of
itself to warrant criminal action.
These specific distinguishing characteristics in
the statutes are very important.
general purpose of the statute.

They are rooted in the
Clearly the most important

distinguishing feature is the official custodial capacity of
the actor.

Such character distinctions are sanctioned

elsewhere in the law; for example, a restricted person can
commit crimes by conduct that would not constitute crimes if
the conduct was perpetrated by an unrestricted person.
Code Ann.,§ 76-10-503 (1953), as amended.

Utah

These

classifications are justified for two reasons.

First, a

person can manifest his unwillingness to comport to the norms
of society and therefore be restricted from some activities to
reduce his burden of voluntary compliance.

Second, a person

may voluntarily assume a higher standard of care and duty
toward the public.

Here, the public has a right to rely on

the assumption of the trust and enforces the right by making
the acts by someone in official capacity in some instances
criminal where they would not be criminal if done by a nonofficial.

The state interest outweighs the possibility that

such character distinctions are discriminatory.
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The distinguishing element of official custodial
capacity was established in "the common law, fixed by the
habits and customs of· the people."
289, 294 (Me. 1931).

Tuscan v. Smith, 153 A.

An official custodian's scrupulous duty

with respect to public funds and the record thereof was
established in 1845 by the United States Supreme Court, where
Justice McLean opined:
Public policy requires that every
depository of the public money should be
held to a strict accountability.
Not
only that he should exercise the highest
degree of vigilance, but that "he should
keep safely" the moneys which come into
his hands. Any relaxation of this would
open a door to frauds, which might be
practiced with impunity . . . . Let such a
principle be applied to our postmasters,
collectors of the customs, receivers of
the public moneys, and others who receive
more or less of the public funds, . . •
United States v. Prescott, 3 How (U.S.) 578, 588, 589 (1845).
Strict accountability requires the keeping of a public record
of funds.
The evident purpose is to prevent fraud
and insure honest administration.
The
evil of permitting willfull destruction
.of such a public record required by law
to be kept is apparent.
People v. McAtee, 95 P.2d 471, 473 (Cal. 1939).
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Because of the numerous substantive differences in
these two statutes, it is clear that they do not proscribe the
same conduct.

Accordingly, under Rammell v. Smith, Utah, 560

P.2d 1108 (1977), the statute which most specifically applies
to the facts will apply.

Since the appellant was an official

with custody of the record, and the jury found that she
wilfully destroyed the record, the state applied the more
appropriate statute ana the conviction should stand.
The defendant says she fails to understand the
rationale for the varying degrees of penalty proscribed by §§
76-6-504, 76-8-412, and 76-8-413, Utah Code Ann.
amended.

(1953), as

Section 76-6-413 states:
Every person, not an officer such as is
referred to in the preceding section, who
is guilty of any of the acts specified in
that section is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.

Sections 76-8-412 and 76-6-504, discussed earlier, provide
penalties of felony of the third degree and class B
misdemeanor, respectively.

Although Section 76-8-413 is not

at issue on appeal, it may be helpful to outline the reasoning
for the various penalties in the three statutes.
A violation of Section 76-6-504 requires a showing
of the elements of fraua, one of which is damage, and the
evidence of some other wrongdoing.

Presumably, a party guilty

of violating Section 76-6-504 may be dealt with under the
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penalty provisions provided by statutes governing the coveredup wrongdoing or harm commensurate with the nature of the
harm.

Thus, the penalty for the cover-up is negligible since

the destruction of a record becomes a minor part of the
criminal activity warranting class B misdemeanor treatment.
In contrast, the willful destruction of a public
record held in trust by an officer can be prosecuted without
the showing of any harm done to the government.
misconduct or deceit is necessary.

No associated

The crime is the breach of

the trust and possible loss of government integrity.

The

crime· therefore warrants the penalty of a third-degree felony.
Finally, Section 76-8-413, which again protects the
integrity of the government, is compared.

This statute is

identical by reference to Section 76-8-412 in all respects
except the actor.

So it is distinguishable in all respects

from Section 76-6-504 as was Section 76-8-412 exceot for the
..L

capacity of the actor.

The intense government interest in the

records over which its officials have custody warrants the
designation of class A misdemeanor for this statute.
Additionally, violation of Section 76-8-413 necessitates some
form of trespass, where a violation of Section 76-6-504 does
not.

These three statutes were carefully drafted to proscribe

different conduct and should be applied accordingly.

-22Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
The appellant was not prejudiced by the
prosecutor's statements to the jury at trial and the appellant

was charged with a crime under the appropriate statute.

There

being no error below, the decision should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of March,
1982.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
General

DORI US
Assistant Attorney General
EARL F.
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